(1. 南京航空航天大学经济与管理学院,南京210016;2. 安徽工程大学管理工程学院, 安徽芜湖241001;3. 福建农林大学交通与土木工程学院,福州 350002)
(1. College of Economics and Management,Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics,Nanjing 210016,China;2. College of Management Engineering,Anhui Polytechnic University,Wuhu 241001,China;3. College of Transportation and Civil Engineering,Fujian Agriculture and Forestry University,Fuzhou 350002,China)
In a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, we construct the decision-making game model by considering fairness concerns under different warranty modes. The impact of warranty modes and retailer's fairness concerns on CLSC pricing and warranty period decisions as well as the economic and environmental benefit is discussed, and the warranty efficiency of different warranty models is analyzed. The results show that when consumers are more sensitive to different warranty periods between new and remanufactured products, manufacturers or retailers will provide long-term warranty services for remanufactured products; retailers' fairness concerns will reduce the wholesale prices of both the new and remanufactured products; the impact of the fairness concerns on the sale price and warranty period of remanufactured products and the economic and environmental benefits of the supply chain are closely related to different product warranty modes. The economic and environmental benefits of the two warranty modes are contingent on the warranty costs and the relative environmental advantages of the remanufactured products. When the relative cost advantage of retailer warranty and the relative environmental advantage of remanufactured products are significant (weak), the retailer (manufacturer) warranty mode is the consistent decision made by stakeholders in the CLSC. The retailer warranty model can reduce the negative impact of retailer's fairness concerns on the economic and environmental benefits of the CLSC.