政府补贴和成本共担如何影响平台和企业策略选择?——基于三方演化博弈
作者:
作者单位:

1.西安电子科技大学;2.中国科学院数学与系统科学研究院

作者简介:

通讯作者:

中图分类号:

TP273

基金项目:

国家自然科学基金项目(面上项目,重点项目,重大项目)


How do government subsidies and cost sharing affect platform and enterprise strategy choice? ——Based on tripartite evolutionary game
Author:
Affiliation:

Xidian University

Fund Project:

The National Natural Science Foundation of China (General Program, Key Program, Major Research Plan)

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    摘要:

    基于地方政府对工业互联网平台和加入平台的制造业企业的补贴以及工业互联网平台和制造业企业间的成本共担, 本文构建了“政府-平台-企业” 三个主体之间的非对称演化博弈模型, 运用微分方程的稳定性定理分析了各博弈主体的策略演化路径以及影响其策略演化的因素, 并通过雅克比矩阵探讨了系统的演化稳定策略. 在数值仿真部分分析了政府补贴力度和平台成本分担比例对系统演化稳定策略的影响, 界定了可以促使制造业企业加入平台、工业互联网平台进行优化服务的政府补贴力度和成本分担比例的有效区间. 为地方政府、工业互联网平台和制造业企业的行为决策提供理论参考.

    Abstract:

    Based on the local government"s subsidy for the industrial internet platform and the platform of manufacturing enterprise, and the cost sharing between the industrial internet platform and the manufacturing enterprise, this paper constructs the asymmetry evolutionary game model between "government-platform-enterprise” , using the stability theorem of differential equations to analyze the strategy evolution path of each game player and the factors that affect their strategy evolution, and discuss the evolutionary stability strategy of the system through the Jacobian matrix. In the numerical simulation part, the influence of government subsidy intensity and platform cost sharing ratio on the system evolution and stability strategy is analyzed, and the effective interval of government subsidy intensity and cost sharing ratio which can encourage manufacturing enterprise to join the platform and industrial Internet platform to optimize the service is defined.It provides theoretical reference for local government, industrial Internet platform and manufacturing enterprises to make behavioral decisions.

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历史
  • 收稿日期:2021-05-14
  • 最后修改日期:2021-08-12
  • 录用日期:2021-08-18
  • 在线发布日期: 2021-09-01
  • 出版日期: