竞争环境下硬件平台的激励合同选择策略研究
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电子科技大学经济与管理学院

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F273

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国家自然科学基金项目(面上项目,重点项目,重大项目)


Research on incentive contract selection strategy ofhardware platform in competitive environment
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School of Economics and Management, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China

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    摘要:

    本文讨论了竞争环境下硬件平台的激励合同选择问题,旨在研究竞争环境下硬件平台的三部定价激励合同与传统接入费合同的表现,识别硬件平台激励合同竞争模式的动态演变过程,并对最终市场均衡进行分析。首先,建立硬件平台竞争博弈模型,研究两个平台均提供传统接入费合同、均提供三部定价合同、以及分别提供三部定价合同和传统接入费合同这三种情况下的博弈均衡和绩效情况。接着,比较上述三种情况下硬件商和软件商的利润,分析了三部定价激励合同与传统接入费合同的不同表现。最后,从硬件商和软件商同时实现帕累托改进的角度,识别竞争性硬件平台的激励合同博弈演化过程并分析最终博弈均衡。结果表明,硬件平台竞争博弈最终会收敛到两个硬件商均使用激励合同的纳什均衡,而这在某些情况下反而会使各平台陷入利润的囚徒困境。

    Abstract:

    This article mainly discusses the selection of incentive contracts of hardware platforms in the competitive environment, aiming to study the performance of the three tariff contracts and traditional access fee contracts of hardware platforms in the competitive environment, and identify the dynamic evolution of the competition model of hardware platform incentive contracts, and analyzes the final market equilibrium. First of all, this paper establishes a hardware platform competition game model, and studies the game equilibrium and performance in the three cases in which both platforms provide the traditional access fee contracts, both provide the three tariff contracts, and provide the three tariff contracts and traditional access fee contracts respectively. Then, it compares the profits of hardware vendors and software vendors in the above three cases, and analyzes the different performance of the three tariff contracts and the traditional access fee contracts. Finally, from the perspective of hardware vendors and software vendors achieving Pareto improvement at the same time, the evolution process of the incentive contract game of competitive hardware platforms is identified and the final game equilibrium is analyzed. The results show that the hardware platform competition game will eventually converge to a Nash equilibrium in which both hardware vendors use incentive contracts, which in some cases will instead make each platform fall into the prisoner’s dilemma of profit.

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  • 收稿日期:2020-12-21
  • 最后修改日期:2021-04-09
  • 录用日期:2021-04-21
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