1.Xizang Minzu University;2.Southeast University
考虑政府征收碳税及再制造专利保护,建立了原制造商和第三方再制造商不同决策情形的博弈模型,探讨 了碳税、碳减排对制造/再制造决策的影响.研究结果表明:碳税使原制造商收益受损,当再制造产品接受度大于再 制造碳排放比率时,碳税使再制造商利润增加;碳减排使新产品产量增加,原制造商利润增加;碳减排使再制造专利 许可费提高,不利于废旧产品回收,再制造商利润不一定增加;集中决策下废旧产品的回收率和供应链总利润均高 于分散决策,当满足碳税促进再制造的条件时,集中决策具有更好的环境绩效;针对分散决策的效率损失,原制造商 收取适当专利许可费,再制造商分担部分减排成本,能够实现闭环供应链的协调.最后,运用数值仿真验证了以上结 论,并进一步分析了碳税和碳排放比率对减排率的影响.
Considering the carbon tax policy and remanufacturing patent protection, the game models of different scenarios between an original equipment manufacturer and third-party remanufacturer were established, and the impacts of the carbon tax and emission reduction on manufacturing/remanufacturing decisions were discussed. The results show that a carbon tax hurts the manufacturer’s profit. When the acceptance level of the remanufactured products is higher than the emission intensity of the remanufactured products, carbon tax will increase the remanufacturer’s profit; emission reduction increases the quantity of the new products and the manufacturer’s profit. However, emission reduction increases the licensing fee, which is not conducive to recycling, so the remanufacturer’s profit may not necessarily increase. The recovery rate and total profit in the centralized decision-making are all higher than those in the decentralized scenario. When the condition for carbon tax to promote remanufacturing is met, the total carbon emissions will decrease in the centralized scenario. For the coordination of the closed-loop supply chain, the manufacturer should charge an appropriate license fee, and the remanufacturer should bear part of the emission reduction cost. Finally, the results are verified by numerical simulation, and the effects of the carbon tax and emission intensity of the remanufactured products on the emission reduction rate are further analyzed.