Zhejiang Gongshang University
Natural Science Foundation of Zhejiang Province, China
In recent years, the empowerment behavior of platform e-commerce enterprises to supply chain partners has increased rapidly, which has an important influence on the operational decisions and benefits of supply chain members. In this paper, in the scenario of platform e-commerce enterprises’brand empowerment behavior, this article studies the incentive mechanism considering vertical channel conflicts among supply chain members in a supply chain,which composes of one platform e-commerce enterprise, one retailer and one supplier of other channel. Under the condition of Information asymmetry, it also discusses how the platform e-commerce enterprise as a core enterprise can use the mechanism design method to identify the quality of products ordered by the retailer from the other channel supplier. The results show that, the platform e-commerce enterprise can increase the number and proportion of products ordered by the retailer from platform e-commerce enterprise by setting incentive mechanism under the pooling strategy and the separating strategy. If the retailer has a high probability of ordering products from other channel suppliers with a higher product quality, the platform e-commerce enterprise adopts a separating strategy which is more conducive to increasing the total order volume of the retailer, otherwise it should adopt a pooling strategy. The expected profit of platform e-commerce enterprise under the separating strategy is greater than that of the pooling strategy，and both are greater than the case where no incentive mechanism is provided to the retailer.