引用本文:周正龙,胡凤英,马本江,等.社会网络环境下利益抗争的群策略研究[J].控制与决策,2021,36(1):206-215
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社会网络环境下利益抗争的群策略研究
周正龙1, 胡凤英2, 马本江2, 卢新元1, 李延晖1
(1. 华中师范大学信息管理学院,武汉430079;2. 中南大学商学院,长沙410083)
摘要:
引入个人决策树和社会网络研究个体在利益抗争中的策略问题,并探讨个体进行维权时的期望收益如何受二次决策影响,分析个体的社会网络链接如何影响群策略结果.研究指出,在依法维权失败的情形下,如果亲群体行为的成本较大或该行为成功率较小,则不宜采取亲群体行为;反之,在二次决策时可以采取亲群体行为.进一步地,在满足一定条件下,个体在社会网络环境下可以主动联系其他个体参与维权或接受邀请进行群体维权,且不管个体是否加入亲群体行为,个人意愿与群策略选择存在分离现象,导致个体存在个体策略与群体策略的均衡分离.因此,在社会网络环境下如果想争取的利益越高,则越容易组织群体维权,而成本越高则越不容易组织群体维权.最后,通过精装房维权案例验证研究结果的有效性,并提供相应的政策建议.
关键词:  利益抗争  决策树  社会网络  群策略选择
DOI:10.13195/j.kzyjc.2019.0497
分类号:F270;C931.1
基金项目:国家自然科学基金项目(71471073);中国博士后科学基金面上项目(2019M652682);湖北省博士后科技活动择优项目(2018Z37);中央高校青年学术创新团队项目(CCNU19TD013);中央高校自主探索创新项目(CCNU18TS040);中央高校青年教师项目(CCNU20QN016).
Group strategy in struggling for interests under social network
ZHOU Zheng-long1,HU Feng-ying2,MA Ben-jiang2,LU Xin-yuan1,LI Yan-hui1
(1. School of Information Management,Central China Normal University,Wuhan430079,China;2. Business School,Central South University,Changsha410083,China)
Abstract:
This paper introduces a personal decision tree and a social network to study the individual's strategy in the interest struggle, and explores how the individual's expected return is affected by the second decision in the rights protection, and analyzes how the individual's social network link affects the group strategy result. The results show that in the case of failure to defend rights according to law, if the cost of pro-group behavior is large or the success rate of the behavior is small, it is not appropriate to adopt pro-group behavior; Conversely, pro-group behavior can be adopted in the second decision-making. Further, under the corresponding conditions, the individual may actively contact other individuals to participate in the rights protection or accept the invitation to participate in the group rights protection under the social network. Regardless of whether the individual participates in the pro-group behavior, the personal desire and the group strategy selection are separated, resulting in the equilibrium separation of individuals between the individual strategy and the group strategy. Therefore, under the social network, the higher the interest you want to fight, the easier it is to organize group, and the higher the cost is, the less likely it is to organize group for the rights protection. Finally, the hardcover room case is used to verify the effectiveness of the research results, and corresponding policy recommendations are provided.
Key words:  interest struggle  decision tree  social network  group strategy selection

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