引用本文:李友东,谢鑫鹏,王锋正,等.考虑碳配额和交易的排放依赖型供应链低碳化运营决策[J].控制与决策,2020,35(9):2236-2244
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考虑碳配额和交易的排放依赖型供应链低碳化运营决策
李友东1, 谢鑫鹏2, 王锋正3, 王景峰1
(1. 内蒙古财经大学工商管理学院,呼和浩特010070;2. 中国人民解放军陆军军事交通学院投送装备保障系,天津300161;3. 内蒙古大学经济管理学院,呼和浩特010021)
摘要:
考虑由排放依赖型产品制造商和碳排放权供应商组成的排放依赖型供应链系统,该系统不仅受产品碳排放的限制和政府碳排放规则的管制,还要充分考虑供应商关于碳排放权价格的影响.通过建立零供两主体的Stackelberg博弈模型,得出它们互为反应函数的Nash均衡解.在此基础上,讨论并分析产品碳排放量及政府碳排放约束对最优解及最优利润的影响关系.结果表明:单位产品碳排放量和政府的碳排放限额对两主体利润的影响是呈反向关系;零供两主体在充分考虑生产单位易逝品时所产生的碳排放量与政府的碳排放管制下,仍然有可以提高自身的利润空间.排放依赖型产品制造商应该有效地治理产品的碳排放量,政府也应该合理地制定碳排放上限值,以使得零供两主体的效用增量和达到最优.最后,选取合理数据用实例仿真方法验证所给出模型和策略的有效性.
关键词:  碳配额  政府碳排放规制  碳排放交易  排放依赖  广义递增失效率  利润分享比例
DOI:10.13195/j.kzyjc.2019.0166
分类号:F274.8
基金项目:国家重点研发计划项目(2017YFC0506703);国家自然科学基金地区项目(71563033);教育部创新团队发展计划项目(IRT1258);教育部人文社会科学研究一般项目(18YJC630179);内蒙古自然科学基金项目(2018MS07016).
Emission-dependent supply chain low-carbonization based behavior of enterprise operation decision under cap-and-trade environment
LI You-dong1,XIE Xin-peng2,WANG Feng-zheng3,WANG Jing-feng1
(1. School of Business Administration,Inner Mongolia University of Finance and Economics,Hohhot010070,China;2. Department of Military Automobile, Military Traffic Institute of PLA,Tianjin300161,China;3. School of Economics and Management,Inner Mongolia University,Hohhot010021,China)
Abstract:
The paper considers an emission-dependent supply chain consisting of one single emission dependent manufacturer and one single emission permit supplier in the government's ‘cap-and-trade’ regulation. The system will not only be influenced by product carbon footprint and government carbon emissions caps, but also affected by the carbon price decision of the upstream supplier. By the establishment of the two agents Stackelberg game model, their mutual reflecting Nash equilibrium solution can be obtained. On this basis,we discuss and analyze the relationships between product carbon emission, government's ‘cap-and-trade’ regulation and optimal solution. The results show that the impact of unit product's carbon emission and the government's ‘cap-and-trade’ regulation on two agents' profit is inversed. Product's carbon emissions and government's carbon regulation can both provide an improvement space for the two agents to get more profits. Manufacturers should effectively control product's carbon emissions, and governments should reasonably determine carbon emissions cap. Only in this way can make the increment of the two agents' utility optimal. At last, a numerical experiment is given to prove the validity of the developed models and policy by selecting reasonable data.
Key words:  carbon emission quota  government regulation of carbon emission  carbon permit trade  emission- dependent  generalized increasing failure rate  profit sharing rate

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